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On August 3, 2013, the controver-sial and crisis-ridden eight-year tenure of President Ahmadine-jad came to an end — leaving a 
sad legacy behind.  This review intends to 
trace this legacy to its major causes.
       Of the six politicians who served as 
president of the Islamic Republic between 
1979 and 2013, none has been so merci-
lessly vilified by a multitude of his detrac-
tors, or so admiringly praised by his wor-
shipful friends and acolytes, as Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. There is also no doubt that 
he has been both patriotic and well-mean-
ing. What he did to the country and the 
economy clearly reflected the best of his 
knowledge and intentions. He was a true 
supporter of the poor and underprivileged. 
Yet his decisions and actions damaged 
the Iranian polity, society, and economy 
more than those of any other leader of the 
Islamic Republic.
 A self-made man from a large work-
ing-class family with brief civil service as 
a provincial governor and a controversial 
tenure as the mayor of Tehran, he won a 
stunning presidential victory in 2005 — 
trouncing four political giants, including a 
former two-time president and a pillar of 
the 1979 revolution.
 This darkest of all dark horses man-
aged to win another term in 2009, defeat-
ing a former wartime prime minister and a 
former speaker of the Majlis. The second 
victory, however, was marred by wide-
spread accusations of vote-rigging and 
fraud. Massive street demonstrations pro-
testing his election resulted in bloodshed, 
incarceration of peaceful protesters and the 
house arrest of his two main rivals. Fac-
ing this havoc, he still struck an arrogant, 
defiant and combative attitude, calling the 
protesters “weeds and debris.” His second 
term also turned out to be crisis-ridden as 
he tangled openly with the Majlis speaker 
and the judiciary chief, was overridden 
by the supreme leader on several occa-
sions, and steadily lost the full support of 
conservative Majlis deputies and hard-line 
newspapers.
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Republic’s lexicon) has to be challenged 
for both political and religious reasons.
 Having caused a sea change in Iranian 
politics by besting four better-known, 
more experienced, more attractive, more 
qualified and more promising contend-
ers, he was naturally expected to show a 
certain humility and to exhibit respect for 
the defeated elders and a willingness to 
consult with them. Instead, he took a defi-
ant, condescending and dismissive attitude, 
repeatedly bragging about his more than 
20 million votes and claiming to have a 
mandate for drastic change. 
MANAGEMENT STYLE
 As a political neophyte with little 
managerial knowledge or experience but a 
huge ego and unbounded self-confidence, 
he confronted his formidable presidential 
tasks with a naive abandon. He adopted an 
informal, down-to-earth manner but micro-
managed behavior, often in clear viola-
tion of statutory requirements. Convening 
cabinet meetings periodically in all of the 
country’s 31 ostans (provinces), making 
hundreds of personal trips to different cit-
ies, answering millions of petitions from 
the rank and file, approving thousands of 
small development projects on the spot 
during his provincial trips exemplify his 
populist style.
 Arbitrary selection of staff and bu-
reaucratic cadres was another hallmark of 
his administration. Instead of considering 
expertise, experience and professional 
qualifications as criteria for choosing the 
government’s top officers, he chose profes-
sional affinity, personal loyalty and total 
obedience. True to form, he methodically 
dismissed the technocrats assembled by 
his two predecessors and replaced them by 
commanders from the Islamic Revolution 
Guard Corp (IRGC) and the Basij militia. 
 As it ultimately turned out, he was 
the wrong man for the job. He lacked the 
proper dignity and maturity to handle his 
position, mismanaged the country’s deli-
cate and vulnerable economy, and adopted 
a needlessly belligerent and defiant posi-
tion toward the West. 
PERSONAL VALUES
 As a product of hard-scrabble roots 
and a self-styled crusader for the poor 
and the disenfranchised, Ahmadinejad 
perceived economics as a handbook for 
distributing assets and income rather than 
primarily a source of income and wealth 
creation. A pious Muslim, he rejected all 
non-Islamic economic systems — capi-
talism, socialism and communism — as 
unjust, exploitative and oppressive. Conse-
quently, he found the current personal and 
regional distribution of wealth and income 
in the global as well as the Iranian econ-
omy unfair, unjust and distorted. He also 
harbored an irrational personal and ideo-
logical grudge against banks and bankers, 
wishing to abolish interest payments and 
encourage non-interest banking institu-
tions (Qarzol-Hassaneh). He distrusted big 
business, favoring small production units. 
He regarded inflation a result of higher 
production costs rather than a monetary 
phenomenon. Believing money to be 
the answer to every social and economic 
problem, he undertook an unprecedented 
expansionary monetary policy. He believed 
that the reform and reconstruction mea-
sures undertaken by his two predecessors 
had benefited some privileged segments 
of society and bypassed the masses. In 
particular, he thought that the oil money 
had been unjustly distributed. An ardent 
Iranian chauvinist and an Islamic zealot, he 
believed that the West’s “geopolitical hege-
mony” (called “arrogance” in the Islamic 
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hours on one of his provincial trips) and 
other such actions demonstrate his govern-
ing style.4  One of his dismissed cabinet 
ministers describes him as an egotist who 
dismisses his critics, feels answerable to no 
one, places blame on others and belittles 
everyone around him.
 He and his disciples have frequently 
bragged about his international reputation. 
One of his ardent devotees has called him 
“a unique and incomparable global lead-
er.”5  He himself once said about his trips 
to various countries, “Everyone is eager 
to hear the Iranian people’s message. The 
world is rapidly becoming Ahmadinejad-
ized.” 6  In a sense, no head of a govern-
ment of the size and significance of Iran 
has been so well-known and talked about 
around the globe. He was the butt of jokes 
on late-night American comedy shows and 
a gift from heaven to cartoonists.
ECONOMIC APPROACH
 With the exception of Ahmadinejad 
himself and his small circle of friends 
and admirers, there is no analyst inside or 
outside of Iran who does not believe that 
the Iranian economy was grossly misman-
aged, if not permanently damaged, during 
his administration. The extent and dimen-
sions of this mismanagement, however, 
are hard to assess due to the official data 
that is deliberately withheld, camouflaged, 
doctored, falsified or contradicted by the 
agencies involved.7 A recent report by the 
Majlis’ Research Center refers to most of 
the 2005-13 official data as defective and 
misleading.8 A Majlis deputy has asked for 
an independent governmental commission 
to review all data presented by the admin-
istration.9  
 After publishing cryptic and question-
able data on basic economic indicators in 
his first term, the administration stopped 
At one time, 12 of his 18-member cabinet 
were from these two organizations; and 
when his administration ended, six minis-
ters were still former military and security 
officers. By one estimate, the share of the 
IRGC in the economy increased 10 times 
during his tenure.
 Adulation was his second major crite-
rion for personnel selection. For example, 
a mid-level functionary who described him 
as “the third century’s miracle-maker,” 
and his maskan-e-mehr housing project as 
“the finest undertaking since Adam,” 1 was 
promoted to first vice president. A director 
of Iran’s Tourist Organization who called 
him “Iran’s golden opportunity,” whose 
“audacity has now become universally 
recognized”2 became his chief of staff and 
number-one adviser. A professor in one of 
Iran’s third-rate universities was made a 
cabinet minister, as he had supervised the 
president’s doctoral thesis on traffic man-
agement.
 Ahmadinejad’s dictatorial tendencies 
were another hallmark of his eight-year 
administration. Unquestioned acceptance 
of his decisions and faithful execution of 
his orders were prerequisites for holding 
major state positions. Failure resulted in 
quick dismissal. 3 A score of administra-
tive and economic councils in charge of 
auxiliary decision making were dismem-
bered in the first few months of his ad-
ministration. And, most significantly, the 
Planning and Budget Organization, the 
purveyor of Iran’s five-year development 
plans and preparation of fiscal budgets, 
was abolished and its duties transferred to 
the president’s office.
 Issuing ministerial decrees contrary 
to established Majlis statutes, refusing 
to execute legislation, hasty and ad hoc 
decisions with no prior preparation (e.g., 
approving some100 small projects in two 
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classes, he called himself the people’s 
“servant” (nokar) and defender of the “op-
pressed” (mazloom); both words signify a 
humbler and sharper connotation in Per-
sian.  He specifically promised to fight the 
“oil mafia,” put oil money on everyone’s 
dinner table, restore full employment 
within two years, and reduce the size of 
government.
 A confessed economic illiterate and 
proud of it, he once said, “Thank God that 
I do not know about economics.”11 He 
embarked on a number of misguided poli-
cies, ignoring all advice from independent 
economists 
and rely-
ing on his 
personal and 
ideological 
tendencies. 
Influenced 
perhaps by 
his austere 
childhood 
and regarding money as the key to every 
economic problem, he began with a highly 
expansionary program: increasing the fis-
cal budget, revving up the Central Bank’s 
printing press, expanding bank lending, 
and removing every administrative barrier 
to his plans. He dismissed several Central 
Bank governors who abstained from mone-
tizing the government’s debt. According to 
a newspaper report, some 500 trillion rials 
were printed and put into circulation dur-
ing Ahmadinejad’s tenure.12  At the same 
time, the government debt to the banks and 
the private sector during his tenure reached 
1,800 trillion rials ($72 billion).13
 The annual budget went up 5 percent 
above the inflation rate, from 1,590,000 
billion rials in 2005 to 7,280,000 billion in 
2013 — 4.5 times — with a deficit every 
year. Corresponding total liquidity in-
releasing figures in 2008 on national 
income (GDP growth).  Figures on infla-
tion and unemployment released by the 
Central Bank and the Statistical Center 
have been contradictory and dubious. 
Figures on foreign-exchange reserves are 
labeled “confidential” and not published. 
Budget deficits are routinely camouflaged 
by counting borrowing as revenue. Due 
to these shortcomings, all arguments and 
conclusions made here must be treated with 
caution and subject to necessary correction.
 Ahmadinejad’s eight-year economic 
record may be said to represent the soul 
of his presi-
dency. He 
began his 
tenure with 
lofty rheto-
ric. Slave to 
unnecessary 
details, the 
new presi-
dent initially 
announced four transcendental values, 
fourteen basic objectives, and 58 specific 
proposals to improve the Iranian economy, 
the main popular concern.10  True to his 
campaign promises, these values included 
justice, empathy, service to people, and 
improvements in the country’s material and 
spiritual conditions. The main objectives, 
however, included essentially justice: fight-
ing against poverty, corruption, discrimi-
nation and nepotism; progressing toward 
an Islamic society; and observing justice, 
peace and dignity in international relations.
 His repeated slogans of “justice, com-
passion, fairness and integrity” promis-
ing fair income and wealth distribution, 
increasing economic opportunities, and 
fighting corruption were welcome by a 
large segment of the population. Passing 
as a champion of the poor and working 
Influenced perhaps by his austere 
childhood and regarding money as 
the key to every economic problem, 
Ahmadinejad began with a highly 
expansionary program, removing every 
administrative barrier to his plans. 
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Iran’s non-oil trade balance; and (e) giv-
ing a hefty subsidy to foreign farmers and 
manufacturers. The over-valued exchange 
rate also resulted in increased national 
dependence on the world economy (even 
for essential food items) and capital flight. 
Thus, with the imposition of tough new 
sanctions on Iran’s oil exports and its 
central bank operations, announced in late 
2011, the Iranian rial lost two-thirds of its 
value against the dollar and other foreign 
exchanges. The subsequent era of exchange 
instability was ensured. Strangely enough, 
toward the end of his tenure, when the U.S. 
dollar value of the Iranian rial was fixed by 
the central bank at around 10,000 rials and 
the inflation-adjusted equilibrium rate was 
estimated to be 24,000 rials, the president 
wished to bring the rate down to 5,000 rials.
 The government’s extensive interest-
rate regulation and mandatory lending 
was the second policy mistake. Holding 
interest rates on savings deposits below the 
inflation rate and keeping bank charges on 
commercial and investment loans below 
free-market levels in the bazaar inflicted 
immeasurable damage to the economy. 
Low (and negative) returns on deposits  
discouraged individual savings, stifled 
productive investments, and led savers to 
move their funds from bank accounts to 
such outlets as real estate, precious metals 
and U.S. dollars. Losing savings depos-
its led the commercial banks to steadily 
borrow from the Central Bank for their 
voluntary as well as state-mandated loans. 
As a result, commercial bank debt to the 
Central Bank rose more than 13 times.14  
 Government-dictated loans to favored, 
but money-losing, projects have been a 
main cause of the banks’ skyrocketing 
nonperforming assets — from a mere 70 
trillion rials in 2005 to 700 trillion rials 
in 2013. Sizeable differences between 
creased from 92,000 billion rials to 5,300 
billion — 5.75 times. During the same pe-
riod, the state sector’s debt to the banking 
system went up from 236 trillion rials to 
1152 trillion. A fortuitous rise in oil-export 
receipts gave his administration some $700 
billion — compared to $440 billion re-
ceived by all previous administrations since 
the revolution, and five times the receipts 
between the discovery of oil in 1906 and 
the end of the Pahlavi regime in 1979. 
 Faced with protracted double-digit 
price rises from perennial budget deficits 
and rising debt to the banking system, Ah-
madinejad decided to combat this demand-
caused economic disequilibrium by focus-
ing on the supply side. Thus, instead of 
trying to raise revenues or reduce wasteful 
expenditures, he chose a crowd-pleasing, 
short-term policy of controlling costs, 
with scant regard for its harmful long-term 
implications. To keep household and busi-
ness expenses in check, the government 
proceeded to hold three vital cost factors 
— exchange rates, interest rates and basic 
energy prices — in check through gov-
ernment diktats. The outcome was a near 
disaster in all three areas.
 Regarding a strong national currency 
as a symbol of affluence and prestige, the 
president pushed to keep the Iranian rial 
artificially high against the U.S. dollar 
and other foreign exchange when every 
economic indicator required the opposite 
policy. Keeping the exchange rate artifi-
cially overvalued in order to hold import 
costs down led to a number of trouble-
some consequences: (a) reducing domestic 
producers’ ability to compete with foreign 
suppliers; (b) bringing down domestic 
production capacity of import-competing 
industries by some 30-40 percent; (c) idling 
thousands of workers with each additional 
billion dollars of imports; (d) worsening 
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mandated bank interest rates and the rates 
prevailing in the bazaar, combined with the 
small penalty for late repayments of loans, 
induced some well-connected business-
men to borrow money from the state banks 
at rates in the low 20s, lend the borrowed 
sum in the bazaar at percent rates in the 
30s, and postpone repayment of the loans 
for years at an annual penalty of only 6 
percent!  Poor and unprofessional assess-
ments of borrowers’ proposed projects 
and the concentration of bank loans on a 
few selected megaborrowers were other 
causes of the banking system’s problems. 
Nearly 8 percent of total bank loans are 
now reportedly in the hands of less than 12 
percent of active businessmen. 
 Keeping energy prices artificially 
down for years resulted in profligate 
energy consumption, the continuation of 
energy inefficiencies, the rise of energy-
intensive industries vulnerable to external 
shocks, and a growing need for energy 
imports, severe air pollution and a clear 
rise in energy smuggling to neighboring 
countries.  
 The outcome of this rank mismanage-
ment has been well reflected in the behav-
ior of the main economic indicators. The 
GDP growth of 6.9 percent in 2005 gradu-
ally tapered off year after year, ending the 
last two years of Ahmadinejad administra-
tion (2011 and 2012) in negative territory, 
at minus 1.7 percent and minus 5.4 per-
cent, respectively,15 for an average annual 
growth of 3 percent during the whole peri-
od. Even this modest growth was achieved 
at a very high cost. For each 1 percent of 
growth during the Khatami administration, 
the government had invested $5.4 billion,16 
while the Ahmadinejad administration 
spent $8.2 billion.
 Data on various aspects of employment 
(and unemployment) are among the least 
comprehensive and reliable published by 
the administration. The official unemploy-
ment rate reportedly rose from 11.5 per-
cent in 2005 to 12.2 percent in 2013, with 
more than 3 million people out of jobs. 
The figure for the 15-24 age group was at 
the critical level of 27 percent. Unofficial 
figures indicate 20 percent of the total labor 
force looking for work; with 5 million 
youth entering the job market now, the 
country will soon be faced with 8 million 
seeking employment. Official figures from 
the Statistical Center further show that 
participation in the labor force declined 
from 41 percent in 2005 to 37.3 percent 
in 2012. In short, only about 68,000 jobs 
were created each year from 2005 to 2012; 
about 34,000 annually have been added to 
the unemployed.17 Despite the president’s 
officially expressed sentiment regarding 
women (e.g., the first president to nominate 
three women for his cabinet), women’s 
participation in the labor force was at best 
17 percent. Female unemployment actually 
doubled during the period, in addition to 
women’s being subject to discrimination in 
wages, promotion and tenure.
 The official consumer-price index of 
10.4 percent in 2005 began to rise steadily 
year after year, surpassing 40 percent — 
the world’s third highest — in the summer 
of 2013, when Ahmadinejad’s term ended. 
Private estimates of the price rise were 
consistently higher. Significantly respon-
sible for the steady rise in liquidity and 
consumer prices were the president’s three 
signature projects — financed primarily by 
the Central Bank’s new money creation: 
(1) loans to the so-called “quick returns” 
projects to create 2 million jobs, (2) low-
cost housing in the periphery of large 
cities, and (3) the controversial cash-pay-
ment-based subsidies reform.18  All three 
are considered failed schemes. The hous-
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Corps (IRGC) rapidly took over an in-
creasing segment of the Iranian economy. 
The Khatamol-Anbia Corporation, and its 
sister, Khatamol-Ossia, the engineering 
arms of the IRGC, gradually became the 
largest and richest domestic contractors, 
spreading their wings over such sectors as 
oil, gas, petrochemicals, industry, mines, 
road building, 
irrigation and 
dam construc-
tion, Curi-
ously enough, 
as the UN, 
U.S. and EU 
economic 
sanctions primarily targeted the Corps, 
they all inadvertently helped it to grow by 
overtaking the work of foreign contractors 
and by becoming the contry’s number-one 
smuggler. 
 And, despite frequent promises to 
reduce government’s role in the economy, 
and the budget’s reliance on oil revenues, 
the opposite occurred in both cases.  
Recent information shows that the much-
trumpeted program of privatization during 
Ahmadinejad’s tenure was really a sham: 
only 17 percent of the state enterprises 
were sold to the true private sector, and 83 
percent were taken over by the semi-public 
agencies.19
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 In the foreign arena, just as Western 
frustration with the slow pace of negotia-
tions on Iran’s nuclear program was build-
ing, and the Islamic Republic needed an 
experienced and astute leader to handle the 
situation, the opposite occurred. A narrow-
minded Islamic fanatic, who had never 
traveled outside Iran and was reflexively 
anti-Western, took the helm. Although not 
directly involved in the conduct of nuclear 
ing project alone, according to the current 
housing minister, has been responsible for 
40 percent of the new liquidity.
 To combat inflation, instead of balanc-
ing the budget, reducing bank lending and 
controlling liquidity, Ahmadinejad opened 
the import gates for cheaper competing 
products. Thus, of the nearly $700 billion 
in oil-export 
revenue re-
ceived during 
his eight-year 
tenure — 63 
percent of  all 
oil income 
during the last 
108 years — some $440 billion was spent 
on imports, raising yearly purchases from 
$36 billion to $60 billion. The outcome, 
while benefiting low-income groups by 
decreasing prices, was the destruction of 
domestic industries. At the same time, 
precious foreign exchange received from 
the export of a depleting resource, instead 
if being reinvested to produce new wealth, 
was squandered in the import of petty con-
sumer goods.
 The government claims that, as a result 
of its populist projects, the Gini coefficient 
of income distribution improved. Although 
denied by other reports, even if it were 
true, relative poverty did not diminish, 
and still over 20 percent of the population 
languished in poverty.
 On top of these policy errors, Iran’s 
economy experienced a sea change during 
Ahmadinejad’s tenure in the direction of 
economic militarization — comparable to 
the Indonesian and Egyptian cases. Al-
ready suffering from a large and inefficient 
state sector, it moved further in that direc-
tion, despite earlier promises to reduce it. 
Initiated and supported by Ahmadinejad 
himself, the Islamic Republic’s Guardian 
By being combative and provocative, and 
by repeatedly denying the Holocaust, 
he raised the ire of the civilized world 
and made it impossible for the Islamic 
Republic to pursue a serious foreign policy. 
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negotiations with the P5+1 group, his at-
titudes inflicted irreparable damage to Iran’s 
position. By being combative and provoca-
tive, and by repeatedly denying the Holo-
caust, he raised the ire of the civilized world 
and made it impossible for the Islamic 
Republic to pursue a serious foreign policy. 
Oddly enough, toward the end of his tenure, 
he called his blatantly and damaging state-
ment about Holocaust one of the “greatest 
achievements of his presidency”; he had 
raised “a taboo topic that no one in the West 
allowed to be heard” and thus “broke the 
spine of the Western capitalist regime”!20
 Enormously ambitious and highly 
self-confident, though a novice in diplo-
macy and foreign policy, Ahmadinejad 
lowered the international prestige of Iran 
had gained during the Khatami administra-
tion. He forged an unholy alliance with a 
number of small, poor and wayward coun-
tries in Latin America and Africa against 
Washington, further contributing to Iran’s 
isolation and negative image. His fruitless 
confrontational pronouncements caused 
Iran’s national interest irreparable dam-
age. And, by assuming the role of Western 
“provocateur-in-chief” pursuing confronta-
tion with Washington, the European Union 
and the United Nations,21 he triggered one 
economic sanction after another, under-
mined Iran’s global standing, and ultimate-
ly turned it into a pariah state. Meaningless 
statements like “we do not need the world, 
the world needs us” caused nothing but 
problems. Iran’s relations with Bahrain, 
Yemen, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia badly 
deteriorated due to Tehran’s support of 
Shia minorities in those countries.
A SUI GENERIS PHENOMENON 
 By all indications, Ahmadinejad is 
intelligent, informed and politically astute. 
He often brags about his advanced edu-
cation and his doctorate. He writes and 
speaks eloquently in Farsi. He is a master 
in debate.22 Yet some of his statements and 
proposed projects not only defy explana-
tion,23 but also smack of delusion:
•  The Holocaust did not happen; it was 
a pretext by Western governments to 
justify the establishment of the Zionist 
regime.
•  The September 11 tragedy in Wash-
ington and New York was orchestrated 
by Washington to combat U.S. eco-
nomic recession, a fact accepted by the 
majority of American people and most 
nations around the world.
•  The west created HIV in order to plun-
der Africa.
•  Our Western enemies are preventing 
rain-bearing clouds from coming our 
way, causing draught.
•  One of our 13-year-old students has 
been able to generate nuclear power in 
her basement. We have a sorcerer who, 
getting inspiration from the saints, can 
point to various mines by looking at the 
grass.  
 Equally astonishing have been some 
of his pet proposals. In a country with 
scant rainfall, frequent drought and water 
rationing, he proposed to give every citizen 
2,000 meters of land for a vegetable gar-
den to grow vegetables and sustain him-
self. When he was reminded of the paucity 
of water for such a venture, he said, “God 
never created a land without enough water 
for it!”  In a country already importing 30 
percent of its food, he proposed that Iran’s 
prize-winning population-control program 
be abandoned and that the government 
encourage every family to have four to six 
children, as the country could afford to 
sustain 150 million people. 
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22 For a fuller description of  his character, see Jahangir Amuzegar, “The Ahmadinejad Era,” Journal of Inter-
national Affairs 60, no. 2 (March 2007).
23 For a list of these and similar statements, see radiofarda.com, April  20 2013.
24 www.radiofarda.com August 1, 2013.
lah Khamenei did praise his government 
for its “accomplishments,” particularly for 
propagating and illuminating “revolution-
ary slogans.”24
 Ahmadinejad’s spectacular fall from 
grace is best portrayed in his treatment at 
the hands of the most conservative news-
paper, Kayhan, which normally reflects 
the views of the supreme leader. The lead 
editorial, which had initially labeled his 
administration “the most beloved gov-
ernment” since the Islamic revolution, 
changed its tune. On Tuesday, April, 23, 
2013, it called the outgoing president “a 
coward, a bluffer and insincere.”
A  SORROWFUL FINISH
 Ahmadinejad’s administration came to 
an end without even a whisper. There were 
no celebratory parties, no appreciative 
demonstrations, no praise of his tenure. 
Members of the new government have 
taken turns pointing out his misdeeds. At 
a birthday party organized for him a few 
weeks after leaving office, only 70 people 
showed up. He has shunned public speak-
ing since then.  The only faint praise of his 
services has come from Supreme Leader 
Khamenei, who had backed him all along 
and found the ex-president’s ideas close to 
his own.  At the last meeting of his cabinet 
with the Rahbar in mid-July 2013, Ayatol-
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